Mid-size retail bank (about 800 to 1,200 staff)
Penetration test, July to August 2026, six weeks.
Tested: internet banking, Android and iOS apps, customer APIs, sign-in and account recovery, statement downloads, beneficiary management and a customer-support portal. Core banking, ATM and payment-network infrastructure were out of scope.
Found: 18 issues (4 high, 9 medium, 5 low, none critical).
Main issue: missing server-side permission checks let one customer reach some of another customer's records, and beneficiary approval was not always tied to the exact details approved.
Outcome: ownership checks were added to the affected services and approvals were bound to the approved details. The retest confirmed 15 of 18 fixed, including all 4 high; the rest have owners and dates. No funds were moved.
Payments company (about 100 to 150 staff)
Penetration test, August to September 2026, five weeks.
Tested: merchant dashboard, payment and refund APIs, payment-provider notifications, transaction-status handling, reconciliation, API-key permissions and selected cloud access, using test merchants and provider sandboxes.
Found: 17 issues (4 high, 8 medium, 5 low, none critical).
Main issue: a repeated payment notification could credit a merchant twice, because a completed transaction was not reliably recognized as already processed.
Outcome: notifications are now authenticated, matched to the expected transaction and blocked from updating the ledger twice. The retest confirmed 15 of 17 fixed, including all high and medium issues. No live settlement or customer funds were involved.
B2B SaaS company (about 70 to 100 staff)
Penetration test with focused code review, July 2026, four weeks.
Tested: the multi-tenant web app, customer and admin APIs, workspace invitations, roles, single sign-on, API tokens, background export jobs and cloud file access, using separate test workspaces.
Found: 13 issues (3 high, 6 medium, 4 low, none critical).
Main issue: a background export job did not always keep one customer's data separate from another's.
Outcome: verified customer context now travels through every step of the export, and jobs without it are rejected, with regression tests added. The retest confirmed 12 of 13 fixed, including all high and medium issues.
Online retailer (about 250 to 400 staff)
Penetration test, September 2026, four weeks.
Tested: storefront, mobile APIs, checkout, order management, returns, store-credit refunds, promotional codes and customer-service permissions, including repeated, simultaneous and out-of-order requests.
Found: 16 issues (3 high, 8 medium, 5 low, none critical).
Main issue: two refund requests sent at the same moment could issue store credit twice for one return.
Outcome: refund checks and credit creation now run as one protected step, with unique refund references and limits tied to the original purchase. The retest confirmed 14 of 16 fixed, including all 3 high. Only test orders and test balances were used.
Lending company (about 300 to 500 staff)
Penetration test, July to August 2026, five weeks.
Tested: borrower onboarding, the loan-application portal, mobile APIs, document upload and download, the underwriting dashboard, staff roles and selected cloud storage permissions.
Found: 21 issues (5 high, 10 medium, 6 low, none critical).
Main issue: the loan-application API accepted changes to internal review fields that only authorized lending staff should be able to change.
Outcome: borrower data was separated from internal review data, the APIs now accept only permitted fields, and approval changes require the right staff role. The retest confirmed 18 of 21 fixed, including all 5 high. Only test applications and synthetic documents were used.
Health-tech company (about 150 to 250 staff)
Penetration test, August to September 2026, five weeks.
Tested: patient portal, clinician dashboard, mobile APIs, password recovery, sessions, appointment records, report downloads and selected cloud storage permissions, for patient, clinician and support roles. Medical devices and live treatment systems were out of scope.
Found: 14 issues (3 high, 7 medium, 4 low, none critical).
Main issue: password-recovery tokens were not reliably tied to the right account, which created an account-takeover risk.
Outcome: recovery tokens are now tied to one account, expire quickly and work only once, and affected sessions are revoked. The retest confirmed 13 of 14 fixed, including all high and medium issues. No real patient account or record was touched.
Logistics and warehousing company (about 1,000 to 1,500 staff)
Penetration test and goal-based red team exercise starting from a provided low-privilege vendor account, August to September 2026, seven weeks.
Tested: remote access, selected internal networks, directory permissions, vendor accounts, warehouse-support applications and security monitoring. Staff phishing, vehicles and operational machinery were out of scope.
Found: 24 distinct issues (6 high, 11 medium, 7 low, none critical).
Main issue: broad vendor access and weak network separation let a limited support account reach internal systems beyond its job.
Outcome: vendor access was limited to approved systems, extra privileges were removed, remote access got stronger sign-in, and monitoring now flags unexpected movement between network segments. The retest confirmed 20 of 24 fixed, including all 6 high, and the access path could no longer be reproduced.